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Introduction
The European Union (EU) is the largest agricultural market in the world and accounts for approximately 20% of total exports and imports of agricultural products. Most of the EU's import sources are in developing countries and the least developed countries (LDCs), and the increase of agricultural exports plays a key role in the development and reduction of poverty in these countries. Furthermore, EU programmes include the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which contains a special scheme for the LDCs known as the 'Everything But Arms Agreement' (EBA), the Cotonou Agreement with Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) and the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements (EMA). The EBA provides the LDCs with duty-free accesses to EU markets, without quotas or other restrictions, for most agricultural products. Within the framework of the EBA, the EU has made a commitment to allow duty-free and quota-free access to imports of rice originating in the LDCs, starting in September 2009. In this context, intensified price competition among rice producing countries is foreseeable. Thus, to calculate changes in market shares, accurate estimation of substitution elasticities (or Armington elasticities) between import sources is crucial.
Prior to the last reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), signed in 2003 and entering into force in 2005 or later, the EU imposed a common tariff on the rice exporters.
Nevertheless, since the price of rice is not the same for each trading partner, this tariff represented from 20% to 50% of the import price (depending on the type of rice, the source and the period under consideration). According to the new agreement (EBA), the EU intends to reduce or remove the tariff for some rice exporting countries in 2009 (particularly for LDCs such as Suriname and Guyana). In addition, the EU has many regional trade agreements (RTAs) with other countries, especially with rice exporting countries (Thailand and the USA).
Therefore, the most interesting questions are: After the change in tariffs, will the market shares change? Namely, with a discriminating tariff, what happens to the market share of poor countries in the EU market, or: Could this new tariff regime help the LDCs increase their exports? The identification of the elasticity of substitution plays a key role in the answer to these questions.
The Armington elasticities have a crucial function in applied models used in assessing the impacts of policy changes such as tariffs and taxes. They are based on the assumption that consumers distinguish different varieties of goods by country of origin and, in the case of rice, obtain variable satisfaction depending on the country from which the rice is imported. In addition, these elasticities are important for computable general equilibrium (CGE) models because the degree to which a policy change will affect the country's economic aggregates depends on the level of the elasticity used in the model. The size of these elasticities can also have a large effect on the terms of trade (the ratio of export to import prices that are sometimes used as a proxy for the relative social welfare of a country) and the implied tariff equivalent of trade agreements.
Despite their determinant role, before reaching the conclusions of this article, we found many studies 1 in the literature that did not take into consideration tariffs when estimating Armington elasticities. They justify this omission by the shortage or absence of sufficient data and, allowing themselves a certain latitude as well, they use an untested hypothesis, i.e. that the same tariff applied on all import sources does not change the relative price, thus does not lead to changes in elasticities (regardless of the type of tariff). Most of World Bank and GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) studies view this conception with leniency, but if this negligence leads to changes in the value of substitution elasticities, then the results of these studies cannot be considered entirely valid.
Therefore, we first try to answer the following questions: Does the inclusion of an import tariff in the estimation lead to different estimated Armington elasticities? Second, as was mentioned above: With a discriminating tariff, what happens to the market share of large rice exporters to EU, especially to the market share of the poor countries?
After the removal of obstacles and barriers to trade and the creation of monetary union, agricultural products can be carried and re-exported very easily between EU Member States.
Consequently, in this study we remove the re-exports between EU Member States and only consider the external EU trade.
Most of EU rice import tariffs are fixed-rate tariffs. The fixed-rate term means that the same import tax per unit is applied no matter how much is imported or regardless of the international or domestic prices of the commodity. For example, a fixed-rate tariff on a certain 1 Armington, 1969; Sarris, 1983; Alston et al., 1990; Ito et al., 1990; Yang and Koo, 1993; Davis and Kruse, 1993; Kapuscinski and Warr, 1999; Surry et al., 2001 Gallaway et al., 2003 and Saito, 2004. 
EU's rice tariff regime
The EU is one of the world's largest rice importers in value terms, with approximately 29% of the world's imports (FAOSTAT database). We focus on the two most imported rice types, rice in the husk and rice glazed or polished, for which we have data available. (For greater detail on rice type and classification, see section 4).
In order to protect domestic producers and to control market access, the EU has established both a quota system and a tariff system. There are two separate sets of trade arrangements for EU rice imports: import duties and import quotas. Import quotas: Various preferential quota arrangements exist for rice imports: the GATT quota, ACP quota, EBA quota and some regional trade agreements with exporter countries such as Thailand (table 2) 3 .
i. GATT quota: In the context of the GATT negotiations, the EU has agreed to two separate duty-free quotas of 63,000t and 13,500t for milled/semi-milled rice and quotas of rice in the husk (EU Commission Regulation, 1998).
ii. ACP/OCT quota: Reduced-duty rate quotas of 125,000t ( (1998, 2002, 2003) As it can be seen in table 2, the types of quota are not the same, nor are quotas generally imposed on large exporting countries -with the exception of the ACP quota. In this paper, we follow the Armington procedure to calculate the elasticities of substitution and changes in market access; however, this method alone cannot account for the effects of quotas.
Furthermore, neither exporting countries nor the kinds of rice usually studied benefit from duty-free quotas. Our study focuses on the implications of tariffs.
3. The Armington model 3.1. Overview of the model Armington (1969) proposed to distinguish products from different suppliers in a market.
Using a two-stage budgeting method, he supposed in the first stage that a buyer (or importing country) determines the total quantity to buy to maximize the utility, and in the second-stage, allocates shares of the total quantity to individual suppliers (or exporting countries) in order to minimize the costs. In the first-stage equation, he specifies the total demand for both foreign and domestic products as the dependent variable.
Armington (1969) specifies the CES form for the utility function, which he maximizes, subject to a budget constraint:
S.t.:
where, E is the total expenditure on imports, U is the utility, p i is the price of imported good from source i, q i is the quantity of imports from source i, b is the parameter that gives the weight associated with particular commodity, and σ is the elasticity of substitution between import sources. Thus, if equation (1) is maximized subject to equation (2), we obtain the demand function for q i .
where P is calculated with Stone's price index. 4 Therefore, we can write equation (3) in logarithmic form (equation 5) and estimate it to calculate the elasticity of substitution between the sources (σ):
The Armington model has been widely used for international trade analysis because this simple linear specification is consistent with utility maximization and because it economizes degrees of freedom in empirical applications (Sarris, 1983; Alston et al., 1990; Ito et al., 1990; Duffy et al., 1990; Yang and Koo, 1993; Davis and Kruse, 1993; Kapuscinski and Warr, 1999; Surry et al., 2001; Xu, 2002; Gallaway et al., 2003 and Saito, 2004) .
Suppose now that an importing country imposes a different tariff rate on each import source, such that the utility function is maximized, subject to a new budget constraint:
where p i is the price of the imported good from source i, and t i is the tariff rate of imported good from source i. Consequently, the new Armington equation is:
where P * is calculated with the Stone's price index, explicitly including tariffs. In other words, the Armington model is set up with non-homothetic preferences.
( )
The novelty in specifying preferences is the influence of the non-homothetic parameter µ i .
When µ i =0 for all i, then equation (8) is identical to equation (1), i.e. U is a homothetic CES function with an elasticity of substitution (σ). Additionally, the condition of q i -µ i ≥ 0 is required because consumption must be positive.
If µ i  is positive, it  is interpreted as a subsistence level requirement, consumers having to buy at least µ i of good i, first allocating a fraction of their budget to meet the minimumconsumption requirement. In this case, the Engel curves are straight lines shifted below the origin by a positive constant (figure 1). If µ i  is negative, then the Engel curves are shifted above the origin, implying that consumers buy the commodity if income exceeds a certain level. In neither case (µ i >0, or µ i <0) does the slope of the Engel curves depend on the non-homothetic parameter, even though the elasticity of total consumption (p i q i ) with respect to total income (E) still does.
As in the homothetic CES function, the elasticity of substitution between the q i -µ i is constant. There is no empirical evidence on µ i in the context of trade. As a result, to take into consideration this dimension (µ i ), we need more information, or we have to use non-linear estimates. In this research, equation (10) 
Data
The prices and the quantities of imports are collected from the United Nation Commodity Therefore, data show a shift in the import sources of the EU. In other words, the EU imported more in recent years from South Asia than from the USA or the African countries. Perhaps the greater stability in policies and economic situations, in addition to the higher quality of rice imported from Thailand and India, due to the cheaper price of this product in those countries, are the reasons of this change in the EU market.
Estimated results

Does including a tariff in the estimation alter estimated substitution elasticities?
The suppliers of rice to the EU market are in competition with each other, and the specific supplier's behaviour is not independent from the behaviour of other suppliers in the market.
As a result, the demand equations for all individual products from different suppliers must be estimated simultaneously in a system. The seemingly unrelated regression analysis originally developed by Zellner is appropriate. (table 5) .
Then, with a non-homothetic CES utility function, the estimated σ are equal to 0.99 when a tariff is not included and 1.22 when it is. These estimations too are significantly different from zero at the 5% level (table 4) . Table 6 shows the same results for rice in the husk (σ being equal to 0.87 and 0.99, respectively without and with the tariff inclusion in the estimation). In table 4, µ i is significantly different from zero at the 5% level in three cases without tariffs; it is positive for Australia and negative for India and the rest of the world.
However, it is significantly negative for the USA and Thailand when tariffs are included. In table 6 too, the µ i values are significant and negative for two sources (the USA and the rest of the world). Note: Results after correction of autocorrelation.
At this stage in our study, three remarks can be made. First, including tariffs (even a fixedrate tariff) can well change the results of the Armington model. In other words, ignoring the tariff may lead to underestimation of the elasticity of substitution, and the results may be biased. Secondly, the estimations with a non-homothetic CES function show that estimates of σ depend on the subsistence-level requirements (µ i ). It is particularly worthwhile to consider non-homothetic preferences. If we estimate the model ignoring µ i , the results may turn out to be biased. Thirdly, we can observe that µ i , when significant, is negative. We have already mentioned that if µ i  is negative, then the Engel curves are shifted above the origin, implying that consumers buy (import) the commodity if income exceeds a certain level, in other words under that level of expenditure, there is no import of rice, i.e. the consumers prefer the domestic market (see figure 1 ).
Simulation: discriminating tariff and change in market shares
Before 2004 (prior to the last CAP reform), the EU imposed a common tariff on the entire group of rice exporters and it was approximately between 25% and 50% of the import price (table 1) . 7 According to the EBA Agreement, the EU intends to reduce or remove the tariff for ii. We assume that the EU puts a 25% tariff on the exports of developed countries (which here are the USA and Australia). iii. Similar to the second scenario, but we increase the tariff to 50%. 9 iv. The EU imposes a 25% tariff on all exporters, except the LDCs (here Suriname).
v. Similar to the fourth scenario, but we increase the tariff to 50%.
7 Nevertheless, since the price of rice is not the same for each trading partner, this tariff represented from 25% to 50% of the import price (depending on the type of rice, the source and the period under consideration). 8 The tariff rates equal 262 $/1000 kg and 448 $/1000 kg, respectively for rice in the husk and rice glazed or polished which represent 25% of the imported prices. We choose this scenario because this percentage is the minimum weight of the tariff on rice imports. It can be compared to the tariff analysis in the following scenario (iii), corresponding to the double and the maximum tariff weight.
The results of these scenarios are reported in tables 7 and 8 for rice glazed or polished and in tables 9 and 10 for the rice in the husk. We mention both the imported quantity (tons) and the market accesses (or import shares) (%) for exporters in each table. Comparing tables 7 and 8, and then 9 and 10, the original Armington model shows a larger market access than the non-homothetic model for Suriname for both types of rice. Although the estimated market accesses according to the two models (original and non-homothetic) are different, the direction of changes in the two models is the same. Consequently, in the trade policy reforms, paying attention to the relative import prices is very important. Moreover, this simulation shows that although a preferential tariff could increase market access of the LDCs, this increase is not great. Particularly, this is observed with the two last scenarios (IV and V) which better represent the situation in 2009. The supply side problems (i.e. domestic dilemmas in LDCs such as poor infrastructures, weak technology and small capacity production) could not allow the LDCs to reap the benefits of preferential tariffs.
Conclusion
The Armington model is very well-known for trade analysis of agricultural products. The
Armington elasticities are particularly important for CGE models since they influence the outcomes of policy shocks introduced to these models. Therefore, it is important to measure Thus, we present the Armington model derived from a CES utility function, and then a nonhomothetic CES utility functional form, which is more flexible. We also calculate the Armington elasticities and the market accesses of large rice exporters to the EU.
Our empirical findings, as applied to the import demand for rice of the EU, lead to the following conclusions. 1. The assumption of homotheticity is valid only for specific cases. 2.
Ignoring the import tariff when estimating Armington elasticities may cause them to be underestimated. 3. It is worthwhile considering non-homothetic preferences. Ignoring tariffs and subsistence-level requirements (µ i ) when estimating the model may also lead to biased results.
Adding to these conclusions, the simulation findings demonstrate that in spite of a large difference between import tariff rate of Suriname and other countries (scenario V), its market access would not change greatly. This problem may be caused by the small production capacity and weak technology in LDCs (supply side problems). It shows the weak capacity of such a country to compete with developed countries such as the USA. It could demonstrate how difficult it is for a LDC to increase its market access, and in so doing, to increase its development level. This could also reflect the situation in 2009: even if the LDCs will have free access to the EU rice market, their market access will not increase so largely.
